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_______________ 
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_______________ 
 
FRANKLIN BENJAMIN, by and through his next friend, 
Andre Yock; RICHARD GROGG and FRANK EDGETT, by 
and through their next friend, Joyce McCarthy; SYLVIA 
BALDWIN, by and through her next friend, Shirl Meyers; 
ANTHONY BEARD, by and through his next friend, Nicole 
Turman, on behalf of themselves and all  
others similarly situated 
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; SECRETARY 
OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
 
CRAIG SPRINGSTEAD,  
by and through his father and guardian, Bertin Springstead;  
MARIA MEO, 
 by and through her mother and guardian, Grace Meo;  
DANIEL BASTEK,  
by and through his father and guardian, John Bastek; 
MICHAEL STORM,  
by and through his guardian, Polly Spare;  
BETH ANN LAMBO,  
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by and through her father and guardian, Joseph Lambo;  
RICHARD KOHLER,  
by and through his sister and guardian, Sara Fuller;  
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 Appellants in No. 11-3684 *(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. 12(a)) 
 
DIANE SOLANO, by and through her brother and guardian 
Carl A. Solano, 
                           
Appellant in No. 11-3685 *(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. 12(a)) 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-01182) 
District Judge: Hon. John E. Jones, III 
_______________ 
 
Argued October 3, 2012 
 
BEFORE: FUENTES, FISHER and COWEN,  Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 12, 2012) 
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_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs-Appellees are individuals with “mental 
retardation” who reside in intermediate care facilities 
operated by Defendants-Appellees Department of Public 
Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the 
Secretary of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  By and through their respective next friends, 
they brought this current class action in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging that Defendants have failed to offer community 
services to them and other similarly situated individuals in 
violation of the integration mandates of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  In turn, 
Appellants are several intermediate care facility residents 
who, by and through their own guardians or next friends, 
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have continued to oppose community placement and, among 
other things, have sought to intervene in this case.  This 
matter has already been before this Court in a prior appeal, 
and we ultimately affirmed the District Court‟s denial of a 
motion to intervene filed by all but one of the current 
Appellants in connection with the merits stage of this case. 
 
 At this juncture, Appellants specifically appeal from 
the District Court‟s order denying the motions to intervene 
that they filed in connection with the remedy stage of this 
litigation as well as from the District Court‟s subsequent 
order granting final approval to the settlement agreement 
between Plaintiffs and Defendants.  We conclude that the 
District Court did abuse its discretion by denying intervention 
as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a)(2).  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court‟s 
intervention order insofar as it denied Appellants‟ motions to 
intervene as of right in the remedy stage of this litigation as 
well as its order granting final approval to the parties‟ 
settlement agreement.  We, in turn, will remand this matter to 
the District Court with specific instructions to grant 
Appellants‟ motions to intervene as of right in the remedy 
stage of this litigation as well as to permit Appellants, as 
proper intervenors, to challenge the settlement agreement and 
to seek decertification of the class. 
 
I. 
  As we observed in our prior ruling, the United States 
Supreme Court established in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), “that it is a violation of the 
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[Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)], the 
[Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)], and their implementing 
regulations to force developmentally disabled patients to 
reside in institutions when they are able and willing to live in 
a manner more fully integrated into the community.”  
Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Dep‟t of Pub. Welfare, 432 F. 
App‟x 94, 95 (3d Cir. 2011).  “At the same time, Olmstead 
and the regulations make clear that „community based 
treatment [cannot] be imposed on patients who do not desire 
it.‟”  Id. (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602). 
 
 The named Plaintiffs-Appellees in this class action are 
five individuals with “mental retardation” who are 
institutionalized in intermediate care facilities for persons 
with “mental retardation” (“ICFs/MR”)1 operated by 
Defendants-Appellees Department of Public Welfare of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of Public 
Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (collectively 
“DPW”).  Franklin Benjamin, Richard Grogg, Frank Edgett, 
Sylvia Baldwin, and Anthony Beard—by and through their 
respective next friends and represented by attorneys from the 
Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania (“DRN”)—
specifically alleged in their amended complaint that DPW has 
violated the ADA and the RA by failing “to offer and provide 
                                                 
1
 We note that the mental health community has been 
working to change the terminology used in this context from 
terms such as “mental retardation” to terms like “intellectual 
disabilities.”  Following the example set, inter alia, by the 
definition of the class as well as our own prior ruling in this 
case, we generally use the term “mental retardation.” 
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Plaintiffs with the opportunity to receive services in 
integrated, community settings that are most appropriate 
settings to meet their needs.”  Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. DPW, 
267 F.R.D. 456, 459 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).  In 
their class action allegations, Plaintiffs claimed that “there are 
approximately 1,272 individuals who reside in Pennsylvania‟s 
five state-operated ICFs/MR.”  (JA79.) 
 
Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to certify a class 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).  On 
September 2, 2009, the District Court entered an order 
granting this unopposed motion and certifying the following 
class:  “All persons who:  (1) currently or in the future will 
reside in on [sic] of Pennsylvania‟s state-operated 
intermediate care facilities for persons with mental 
retardation; (2) could reside in the community with 
appropriate services and supports; and (3) do not or would not 
oppose community placement.”  (JA39.)  DPW, for its part, 
filed an unsuccessful motion to dismiss. 
 
The individual Appellants are also ICF/MR residents.  
By and through their guardians or next friends, Appellants 
have continued to oppose community placement and have 
sought to participate in this litigation.  On November 10, 
2009, eight of the nine current Appellants—Craig 
Springstead, Maria Meo, Daniel Bastek, Michael Storm, Beth 
Ann Lambo, Richard Kohler, Maria Kashatus, and Wilson 
Sheppard (who was originally a Plaintiff in this action)—
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moved to intervene (“Springstead Intervenors”).2  The 
existing parties opposed any intervention, and the District 
Court denied this initial intervention motion in a 
memorandum and order entered on March 10, 2010. 
 
According to the District Court, the Springstead 
Intervenors met the applicable timeliness requirement but 
then failed to satisfy the remaining prerequisites for 
intervention as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a)(2) (i.e., a sufficient interest in the litigation, 
the interest may be affected or impaired as a practical matter 
by the disposition of the action, and the interest is not 
adequately represented by an existing party).  It also 
concluded that permissive intervention under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 24(b) was unwarranted. 
 
The Springstead Intervenors appealed.  They were 
supported in this appeal by current Appellant Diane Solano 
(by and through her brother and guardian, Carl Solano, 
Esquire), who appeared as an Amicus. 
 
While this appeal was pending, the existing parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  On January 27, 
2011, the District Court granted Plaintiffs‟ motion with 
respect to the underlying liability of DPW.  See Benjamin ex 
rel. Yock v. DPW, 768 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748-57 (M.D. Pa. 
2011).  Specifically, it entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
and all others similarly situated and declared that DPW was 
                                                 
2
 The Springstead Intervenors also originally included 
Richard Clarke, but he subsequently died. 
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still not in compliance with the integration mandates 
established by the ADA and the RA with respect to these 
individuals.  Acknowledging the Commonwealth‟s budgetary 
constraints and DPW‟s own limited resources, the District 
Court stated that the DPW cannot continue its practice of 
unnecessary segregation.  However, the District Court did not 
believe it was in a position to issue the requested injunction 
“given the need for extensive detail therein and eventual 
oversight for any such relief provided.”  Id. at 757.  It 
therefore stated that this action “will remain open until 
determination of the proper remedy” and scheduled a 
conference call to address the need for further submissions as 
well as for a possible hearing on the question of injunctive 
relief.  Id.  The parties were expressly encouraged to return to 
mediation armed with “this mandate” and attempt “to 
formulate a resolution that implements a realistic plan that 
fully complies with the ADA and RA.”  Id. at 757 n.12. 
 
In a non-precedential opinion filed on April 5, 2011, 
this Court disposed of the appeal filed by the Springstead 
Intervenors.  See Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. DPW, 432 F. 
App‟x 94, 96-99 (3d Cir. 2011).  Generally applying an abuse 
of discretion standard of review, we affirmed the District 
Court‟s denial of both intervention as of right and permissive 
intervention. 
 
Initially, Plaintiffs “recognize that „Olmstead requires 
that patients eligible and desirious of community placement 
be discharged into community-based programs [only] if 
placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into 
account the resources of the state and the needs of other 
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persons in its care.‟”  Id. (quoting Frederick L. v. DPW, 422 
F.3d 151, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2005)).  “By way of remedy,” 
Plaintiffs sought an injunction directing DPW: 
 
. . . (1) to maintain a “Planning List that consists 
of all state ICF/MR residents who have been 
identified as not opposed to discharge to 
community services,” (2) to promptly place “on 
the Planning List the named Plaintiffs and any 
other state ICF/MR residents identified by the 
ICF/MR Facility Directors as having 
affirmatively expressed their desire to be 
discharged to the community,” (3) to question 
“ICF/MR residents and/or their involved family 
or guardians” at least annually regarding their 
current preference in order to keep the Planning 
List current, and (4) beginning in fiscal year 
2011-12, to “develop and implement a viable 
integration plan that provides community 
services to at least 100 individuals on the 
Planning List annually for each of the first three 
years” and for at least 75 individuals from that 
list thereafter until all on the list have been 
discharged. 
 
Id. at 96-97 (citation omitted).  We further noted that 
summary judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs “on the 
liability issue” and that “[t]he remedy issue remains before 
[the District Court].”  Id. at 97. 
 
With respect to intervention as of right under Rule 
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24(a)(2), the Springstead Intervenors specifically “insist that 
their interest in remaining in their current institutional setting 
is clearly sufficient to warrant intervention.”  Id. at 98.  We, 
however, agreed with the District Court “that Intervenors‟ 
interest in maintaining their current form of care is not 
directly in jeopardy in this litigation.”  Id.  In other words: 
 
The current parties have deliberately defined the 
class and the relief sought so that Intervenors‟ 
right to choose institutional treatment would not 
be affected. 
 
 The District Court made its intent clear.  
The class it certified expressly excludes all 
current and future residents of ICFs/MR who 
oppose, or would at any relevant time in the 
future oppose, community placement.  It 
therefore excludes Intervenors, and they will 
not be personally bound by anything that is 
decided in this litigation.  It follows that, if the 
DPW should threaten in the future to coerce 
them into leaving their current institutions, 
Intervenors would be free to file their own suit 
and litigate whether they have a legally 
enforceable right to remain in the institution 
where they currently reside. 
   
Id. (footnotes omitted).  We observed in a footnote that the 
Springstead Intervenors were critical of the class definition 
because it purportedly “requires an inquiry into the mental 
state of class members.”  Id. at 98 n.3.  Nevertheless, this 
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contention, regardless of “[w]hether [it] poses a problem for 
other purposes,” did not pose one in the current context.  Id.  
“It is sufficient for present purposes to hold that their current 
opposition to community placement currently excludes them 
from the class.  If they hereafter are persuaded to drop that 
opposition, they will no longer be in a position to represent 
the interest they seek to defend here.”  Id.  We likewise 
refused to express an opinion as to whether the Springstead 
Intervenors “have a legally enforceable right to remain in the 
institution where they currently reside,” id. at 98, and, 
instead, merely “assume, without deciding, that they do,” id. 
at 98 n.4. 
 
 Having determined that the Springstead Intervenors 
were not class members, we then considered their alternative 
theory that “„their interest is likely to be affected as a 
practical matter by the outcome of the lawsuit because the 
relief sought by Plaintiffs is likely to result in closure of 
ICFs/MR.‟”  Id. at 98 (citation omitted).  While they did not 
suggest a danger that “any remedy afforded to Plaintiffs in 
this action will include a requirement that an ICF/MR be 
closed,” the Springstead Intervenors did fear “that budget 
constraints will cause the DPW to allocate its resources in a 
different manner if it is required by this suit to satisfy its 
obligations under the ADA and that this may result in its 
closing one or more ICFs/MR.”  Id.  We, however, rejected 
this theory: 
 
While it is, of course, possible that 
providing additional community placements 
will occasion some reallocation of the limited 
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resources of the DPW, it is not possible to 
determine at this point whether that reallocation 
will result in the closing of one or more 
ICFs/MR, and we decline to speculate on that 
matter.  It is sufficient to hold that any possible 
impact on Intervenors‟ interest in maintaining 
their current institutional care is not the kind of 
direct impact that gives rise to a right to 
intervene.  In virtually every suit successfully 
prosecuted against a governmental entity, the 
judgment will occasion some reallocation of 
limited public resources.  Every competitor for 
those limited resources has an interest that 
potentially may be adversely affected by that 
reallocation.  We have found no case, however, 
suggesting that the interest of such a competitor 
justifies intervention in litigation addressing 
issues in which he or she has no other interest.  
If such a competitor believes that he or she has 
an enforceable right for the services of the 
public entity, he or she may bring his or her 
own suit.   
 
Where a party has an interest in property 
over which the court has taken jurisdiction, and 
the party has an interest in “being heard with 
respect to the disposition of [a particular] 
fund[,] . . . such an interest is sufficient to 
support an applicant‟s intervention as of right.”  
Mountain Top Condominium Ass‟n v. Dave 
Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 368 
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(3d Cir. 1995).  Here, the court has not taken 
control of DPW funds and Intervenors do not 
have a legal right to particular funds.  They may 
have a right to certain benefits from the state, 
but not a right to a particular fund. 
 
In [Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592 (3d 
Cir. 1987)], we held that a District Attorney 
lacked the right to intervene in a suit seeking a 
cap on the prison population where the DA 
argued such a ceiling would limit his ability to 
carry out his duties as a law enforcement 
officer.  820 F.2d at 601.  Because the DA did 
not administer the prison, and the consent 
decree placing a ceiling on the prison 
population would only tangentially affect his 
ability to prosecute, we held that he had no right 
to intervene.  See [Kleissler v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1998)].  
Similarly here, the relief sought by Plaintiffs—
that the DPW offer a choice of community 
placement to ICF/MR patients who do not 
oppose such placement—will only tangentially 
affect the rights of those who are opposed.  
Intervenors therefore are not entitled to 
intervene as their interests will not be directly 
affected by the relief sought.   
 
Id. at 98-99 (footnote omitted). 
 
 Because we ultimately concluded that “Intervenors 
 16 
lack sufficient interest to intervene,” this Court did not 
address “their contention that the DPW is an inadequate 
representative.”  Id. at 99 n.5. 
 
 On May 19, 2011, Plaintiffs and DPW finalized a 
proposed “Settlement Agreement.”  This fifteen-page 
document contains several significant components, including 
the establishment of:  (1) an annual assessment process to 
create, maintain and update a “Planning List” consisting of 
“all state ICF/MR residents who have been identified as not 
opposed to discharge to community placement” (JA470); (2) 
educational, training, and outreach programs about 
community placement; (3) a viable “Integration Plan” 
providing community placements to a minimum number of 
ICF/MR residents on the Planning List in each fiscal year 
until each and every resident on the Planning List has been 
discharged; and (4) a number of budgetary steps designed to 
facilitate compliance with this Integration Plan. 
 
 The District Court preliminarily approved the 
Settlement Agreement on May 27, 2011.  Notice was then 
disseminated to all ICF/MR residents, guardians, and 
involved family members.  The District Court subsequently 
received, inter alia, at least one objection from an ICF/MR 
resident and 101 objections from guardians or involved 
family members of ICF/MR residents.  Plaintiffs filed an 
unopposed motion for final approval, which was supported, 
inter alia, by the federal government. 
 
 In contrast, the Springstead Intervenors and Solano, in 
addition to submitting their own objections, filed separate 
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motions to intervene.  The District Court formally denied 
Appellants‟ respective intervention motions in an August 16, 
2011 order.  According to the District Court, it “thoroughly 
considered the most effective procedure for the conduct of the 
August 22, 2011 [fairness] hearing and the Objectors‟ 
requests to actively participate.”  (JA34.)  However, it 
determined that there was no cause to honor Appellants‟ 
request to hold a separate hearing on “that matter.”  (Id.)  
“Because it is the parties‟ burden to demonstrate at the 
hearing that the Proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and 
reasonable, we shall take testimony and fact evidence 
presented only by the parties.”  (Id.)   The District Court also 
stated that “we shall fully consider the objections in the 
record and will further allow” Appellants, through one 
attorney designated by them, to question the respective 
witnesses.  (Id.)  Indicating that it thereby was partially 
granting the relief sought by Appellants “by allowing them to 
reasonably participate” in the fairness hearing, the District 
Court incorporated by reference “our March 10, 2010 Order 
denying the Springstead Intervenors‟ original Motion to 
Intervene, which was affirmed by the Third Circuit.”  (Id.)  It 
therefore went on to “find that full intervention is 
unwarranted and improper.”  (Id.) 
 
 The fairness hearing went ahead as scheduled.  The 
existing parties presented testimony from three witnesses:  
Pamela Kuhno, Director for DPW‟s Division for ICF/MR 
Programs, Patricia McCool, Acting Director of DPW‟s 
Bureau of Supports, and Colleen Sassaman, a Facility 
Advocate at the Selinsgrove State Center who (like other 
ICF/MR Facility Advocates) is actually employed by DRN.  
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Mr. Solano cross-examined these witnesses.  The District 
Court also heard from several family members, and Mr. 
Solano was permitted to present arguments on Appellants‟ 
behalf. 
 
 On September 2, 2011, the District Court ultimately 
approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate (and 
also awarded attorney fees and costs to Plaintiffs).  See 
Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. DPW, 807 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203-
214 (M.D. Pa. 2011).  However, in the process, it did express 
some concerns of its own.  In particular, the District Court 
advised the parties to implement the settlement with caution 
due to certain doubts arising out of the protocol and 
questionnaire forms developed by the parties, and it further 
indicated that the parties might wish to revise the protocols at 
issue.  
 
The Springstead Intervenors and Solano filed separate 
notices of appeal.  They also moved for a stay pending 
resolution of their appeals of: 
 
. . . that portion of the [District Court‟s] 
September 2, 2011 decision that permits 
relocation of any State Center resident who has 
been placed on the Planning List because (a) he 
or she was deemed to have expressed “No 
preference” because (in the words of the 
assessment protocol) he or she failed to provide 
input in any manner than can be discerned in 
response to the questions” on the protocol used 
to implement the settlement, and (b) no 
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guardian or involved family member could 
speak on the resident‟s behalf, either because no 
such guardian or family member exists or 
because DPW was unable to contact that person 
and therefore deemed the person to have “No 
preference” regarding where the resident should 
live. 
 
(JA1520-JA1521.)  The District Court denied this motion in a 
December 19, 2011 order, finding that Appellants failed to 
show either a likelihood of success on appeal or a likelihood 
of irreparable injury.  According to the District Court, its 
earlier language regarding the implementation procedures and 
protocol was nothing more than mere dicta.  Meanwhile, the 
two appeals filed by Appellants were consolidated.  After we 
heard oral argument, Appellants filed another motion for a 
partial stay with this Court.  Over Appellees‟ opposition, we 
granted this motion on October 25, 2012. 
 
This Court has also received three amicus briefs.  
VOR, Inc., together with ninety-two individuals who are 
members of this disability rights advocacy organization 
(including several guardians and family members who had 
submitted objections to the Settlement Agreement), filed a 
brief in support of Appellants and reversal.  On the other 
hand, the federal government and, another advocacy 
organization, the Arc of Pennsylvania, submitted briefs in 
support of Appellees and affirmance. 
 
II. 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1343(a).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
 
 This Court reviews “a district court‟s denial of 
permissive intervention and intervention of right for abuse of 
discretion but applies a more stringent standard to denials of 
intervention of right.”  Benjamin, 432 F. App‟x at 97 (citing 
Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992)).  “We 
will reverse a district court‟s determination on a motion to 
intervene of right if the court „applied an improper standard 
or reached a decision that we are confident is incorrect.‟”  Id. 
(quoting Brody, 957 F.2d at 1115). 
 
III. 
 
 Appellants contend that the District Court committed 
reversible error by certifying the class and granting final 
approval to the Settlement Agreement.  Appellees just as 
vigorously defend class certification and the fairness of their 
Settlement Agreement.  However, the current appeals present 
the following threshold question:  whether or not the District 
Court abused its discretion by denying Appellants‟ motions to 
intervene as of right filed in connection with the remedy stage 
of this complex and important case and thereby to challenge, 
as intervenors, the propriety of both the Settlement 
Agreement and class certification.  Taking into account the 
basic requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 
24(a)(2), the specific circumstances of this case, and the fact 
that the District Court actually relied on its liability-stage 
analysis of these requirements to deny Appellants‟ remedy-
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stage motions to intervene, we ultimately conclude that the 
District Court did abuse its discretion.  Simply put, we 
believe that Appellants are entitled to participate as 
intervenors in the remedy stage of this case and—as 
intervenors—should thereby have the opportunity to 
challenge the parties‟ Settlement Agreement and to seek 
decertification of the underlying class.  We, therefore, will 
vacate the District Court‟s order of August 16, 2011 insofar 
as it denied Appellants‟ motions to intervene as of right in the 
remedy stage of this litigation.  We will also vacate the 
District Court‟s September 2, 2011 order granting final 
approval of the Settlement Agreement because Appellants 
should have been allowed to participate as intervening parties.  
We, in turn, will remand this matter to the District Court with 
specific instructions to grant Appellants‟ motions to intervene 
as of right in the remedy stage of this litigation as well as to 
permit Appellants, as proper intervenors, to challenge the 
Settlement Agreement and to seek decertification of the class.  
On the other hand, we express no opinion as to whether or not 
the Settlement Agreement (or any other settlement that may 
be reached in this proceeding) should ultimately be approved 
or disapproved—or whether or not the class itself should be 
decertified.  
 
A. Intervention As Of Right Under Rule 24(a)(2) 
 
 As we recognized in our previous ruling in this 
proceeding, Rule 24(a)(2) provides that 
 
(a)  Intervention of Right.  On timely motion, 
the court must permit anyone to intervene who: 
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. . . .  
   
(2)  claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction that is the subject of the action and 
is so situated that disposing of the action may as 
a practical matter impair or impede the 
movant‟s ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that 
interest. 
 
A movant seeking to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) must 
satisfy the following requirements:  “(1) the application for 
intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient 
interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or 
impaired, as a practical matter, by the disposition of the 
action; and (4) the interest is not adequately represented by an 
existing party in the litigation.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 
418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Harris v. Pernsley, 
820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1987)).   
 
 Appellants moved to intervene after they had received 
notice of the Settlement Agreement signed by the parties.  
While permitting a limited degree of participation at the 
fairness hearing, the District Court formally denied their 
remedy-stage motions to intervene in a short order.  
Significantly, it did so without specifically applying (or even 
mentioning) the prerequisites for intervention as of right.  
Instead, the District Court simply incorporated by reference 
its earlier order denying the original liability-stage motion to 
intervene filed by the Springstead Intervenors and referenced 
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the fact that this Court affirmed its order.  We likewise begin 
our own analysis with our prior ruling in this case, but we do 
not stop there.        
 
 1. Our Prior Ruling and Class Membership 
 
 Not surprisingly, Appellees place particular emphasis 
on our earlier intervention decision and turn to the law of the 
case doctrine.  “„[W]hen a court decides upon a rule of law, 
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in 
subsequent stages in the same case.‟”  In re Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)).  In 
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, this Court should 
generally adhere to its own prior rulings arising out of the 
same case.  See, e.g., id.  
 
 With respect to this narrow issue of class membership, 
we agree with Appellees.  Appellants insist that they are (or 
have become so since this Court‟s prior opinion) members of 
the class certified by the District Court.  However, their 
arguments were previously—and unsuccessfully—advanced 
before both the District Court and this Court.  We observed 
that “the class [that the District Court] certified expressly 
excludes all current and future residents of ICFs/MR who 
oppose, or would at any relevant time in the future oppose, 
community placement” and that “it therefore excludes 
Intervenors.”  Benjamin, 432 F. App‟x at 98 (footnote 
omitted).  Appellants have continued to oppose community 
placement, and the definition of the class itself has not 
changed.  Likewise, we do not believe that our prior 
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conclusion with respect to class membership should be 
altered. 
 
 Appellees also argue that, because Appellants had 
urged this Court to allow intervention based on the class 
definition‟s alleged impropriety (and had relied on the same 
basic grounds that they now raise in the present appeals), we 
thereby litigated and rejected their class certification 
challenge and that our prior determination disposes of 
Appellants‟ current challenge.  However, we simply decided 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
intervention.  We thereby did not actually rule on the specific 
question of whether the class itself should or should not be 
decertified.  Likewise, as we explain in more detail below, we 
rendered our ruling in connection with the liability—as 
opposed to the remedy—stage of this case.  Although we now 
conclude that the District Court committed reversible error as 
to intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) with respect to the remedy 
stage of this case, we similarly need not—and do not 
decide—whether the class itself should (or should not) be 
decertified. 
 
 2. Timeliness 
 
 The District Court did not address the timeliness of 
Appellants‟ remedy-stage motions to intervene.  In its initial 
liability-stage decision (which it incorporated by reference), it 
expressly found that the Springstead Intervenors‟ first motion 
to intervene was filed in a timely fashion, and, in turn, its 
timeliness finding was not raised on appeal.  Appellees 
concede that Appellants‟ subsequent motions were filed in a 
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timely fashion insofar as Appellants sought to challenge the 
Settlement Agreement.  However, they go on to argue that the 
motions were untimely with respect to class certification.  We 
believe that Appellants do satisfy this timeliness requirement.   
 
 “To determine whether the intervention motion is 
timely, we have listed three factors for courts to consider:  (1) 
the stage of the proceeding; (2) the prejudice that delay may 
cause the parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.”  Mountain 
Top, 72 F.3d at 369 (citing In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Liquidation Litig., 695 F.2d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1982)).  There 
is a general reluctance to dispose of a motion to intervene as 
of right on untimeliness grounds because the would-be 
intervenor actually may be seriously harmed if not allowed to 
intervene.  See, e.g., id.  The delay should be measured from 
the time the proposed intervenor knows or should have 
known of the alleged risks to his or her rights or the purported 
representative‟s shortcomings.  See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977).  “The mere passage 
of time, however, does not render an application untimely.”  
Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at 369 (citations omitted). 
 
 The Springstead Intervenors initially moved to 
intervene on November 10, 2009, a relatively short period of 
time after the District Court granted Plaintiffs‟ unopposed 
motion and certified the class on September 2, 2009.  They, 
however, were unsuccessful before both the District Court 
and (together with Solano as Amicus) on appeal.  Given the 
law of the case doctrine, it would have been futile for 
Appellants to file yet another motion to intervene until 
circumstances changed.  They then filed the instant 
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intervention motions after the liability stage of the case was 
finished and the remedy stage began.  In particular, Ms. 
Solano moved to intervene on July 28, 2011, and the 
Springstead Intervenors did so on August 2, 2011.  These 
motions were filed soon after Appellants received (together 
with other ICF/MR residents, guardians, and involved family 
members) notice of the Settlement Agreement negotiated by 
Appellees—which had been preliminarily approved by the 
District Court on May 27, 2011 and which was to be the 
subject of a fairness hearing scheduled for August 22, 2011.  
Appellants also submitted objections to the Settlement 
Agreement and filed their motions to intervene before the 
objection deadline of August 2, 2011.  Although we 
ultimately have concluded to the contrary, Appellants could 
have believed that, given these circumstances, they were now 
members of the class certified by the District Court.  More 
significantly, Appellants, even as non-class members, now 
had more than adequate reasons to believe that—because of 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement itself—they satisfy the 
remaining requirements for intervention as of right with 
respect to this remedy stage of this proceeding.  In fact, we 
actually conclude that they do meet these requirements. 
 
 We similarly note that the class definition in this case 
is quite open-ended.  Individuals—like Appellants 
themselves—could very well become members if, for 
instance, ICF/MR residents, their guardians, or their involved 
family members no longer oppose community placement.  
The Settlement Agreement itself establishes, among other 
things, an annual and mandatory assessment process to 
determine whether the residents (and their guardians and 
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involved family members) no longer oppose community 
placement.  Because the parties‟ Settlement Agreement 
thereby provides a mechanism by which new members will 
continuously be identified and the class composition can—
and will likely—change, we believe that the definition of the 
class does, in fact, affect the fairness of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
 
 Likewise, in certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(2), the 
cohesiveness of the class must be considered with respect to 
whether the relief is appropriate for all class members.  See, 
e.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“The „disparate factual circumstances of class 
members‟ may prevent a class from being cohesive and, 
therefore, make the class unable to be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2).” (quoting Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d 
Cir. 1973))); Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (“What is important is that the relief sought by the 
named plaintiffs should benefit the entire class.”).  The 
fairness of the Settlement Agreement appears to be 
intertwined with the cohesiveness requirement because the 
Settlement Agreement constitutes the relief that Plaintiffs 
ultimately obtained in this litigation.  Appellants‟ objections 
to certification therefore are properly considered as a 
component of their objections to the Settlement Agreement 
itself. 
 
 Insofar as Appellees agree that the intervention 
motions were filed in a timely fashion with respect to the 
Settlement Agreement, we do not see how they could suffer 
any real prejudice if Appellants‟ attempt to intervene with 
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respect to the closely related issue of class certification was 
also considered.  Indeed, “[e]ven after a certification order is 
entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of 
subsequent developments in the litigation.”  General Tel. Co. 
of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (footnote 
omitted). 
 
 3. Interest and Disposition’s Effect on Interest 
 
 In our previous opinion in this case, we affirmed the 
District Court‟s denial of intervention “[b]ecause we conclude 
that Intervenors lack sufficient interest to intervene.”  
Benjamin, 432 F. App‟x at 99 n.5.  We specifically observed 
that “[t]he claimed interest in the litigation must be one that 
„is specific [to those seeking to intervene], is capable of 
definition, and will be directly affected in a substantially 
concrete fashion by the relief sought.‟”  Id. at 98 (quoting 
Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972).  The “„polestar‟” for intervention 
is “„whether the proposed intervenor‟s interest is direct or 
remote.‟”  Id. (quoting Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972).  A 
proposed intervenor‟s interest need not be a legal interest, 
provided that he or she “„will be practically disadvantaged by 
the disposition of the action.‟” Id. at 98 (quoting Kleissler, 
157 F.3d at 970).  “However, rather than merely showing 
some impact, „the applicant must demonstrate that there is a 
tangible threat to a legally cognizable interest to have the 
right to intervene.‟”  Id. (quoting Harris, 820 F.2d at 601). 
 
 Furthermore, proposed intervenors need not possess an 
interest in each and every aspect of the litigation.  See, e.g., 
Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at 368.  Instead, “[t]hey are entitled to 
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intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those 
issues is significantly protectable.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
We therefore have recognized that “it is appropriate in certain 
cases to conduct a two-step examination, separately 
evaluating whether the applicant has a right to intervene at the 
merits stage and whether he or she may intervene to 
participate in devising the remedy.”  Brody, 957 F.2d at 1116 
(citing Harris, 820 F.2d at 599).  In the end, we conclude that 
this is one of those cases. 
 
   In our prior ruling, we did make some references to 
the relief requested by Plaintiffs.  However, these statements 
were made in a specific context—the merits stage of this 
complex case.  We accordingly observed that the District 
Court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs “on 
the liability issue” following the filing of the Springstead 
Intervenors‟ appeal and that “[t]he remedy issue remains 
before it.”  Benjamin, 432 F. App‟x at 97.  In fact, the District 
Court explicitly refused to dispose of this “remedy issue” in 
its summary judgment ruling, explaining that it was not in a 
position to issue the injunction requested by Plaintiffs “given 
the need for extensive detail therein and eventual oversight 
for any such relief provided.”  Benjamin, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 
757.  It also referred to the Commonwealth‟s “budgetary 
constraints” and the DPW‟s own “limited resources.”  Id.  
Scheduling a conference call to address the need for further 
submissions as well as a possible hearing on the extent of 
injunctive relief, the District Court even encouraged the 
parties to return to mediation and formulate “a realistic plan 
that fully complies with the ADA and RA.”  Id. at 757 n.12.   
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 Considering the terms of the Settlement Agreement 
entered by Appellees, we ultimately determine that 
Appellants possess “a sufficient interest” in the remedy stage 
of the litigation and that their “interest may be affected or 
impaired as a practical matter” by the disposition of this 
distinct stage of the litigation.  Simply put, there are several 
components of the Settlement Agreement reached by the 
parties (and ultimately approved by the District Court after it 
denied Appellants‟ motions to intervene) that may affect or 
impair the protectable interests of Appellants themselves as 
well as other ICF/MR residents, guardians, and involved 
family members.  We also note that Appellants‟ interests in 
this stage of this complex yet important case—and the 
possible effects of the disposition of this stage on their 
interests—extend to the District Court‟s underlying class 
definition.  Just like the actual class members, they may be 
affected by the Settlement Agreement and, among other 
things, appear to be in “the best position to apprise the court 
of any unforeseen or undisclosed impact that the class 
definition may have on its evaluation of [a settlement 
agreement].”  Ligas ex rel. Foster v. Maram, No. 05 C 4331, 
2010 WL 1418583, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2010); see also, 
e.g., General Tel. Co., 457 U.S. at 160 (stating that 
certification order may be modified in light of subsequent 
developments). 
 
 Initially, we must not overlook the specific 
characteristics of the ICF/MR residents—as well as their 
guardians and involved family members.  In short, this case 
implicates the health, safety, and welfare of more than a 
thousand highly vulnerable individuals.  For instance, as 
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DPW has closed ICFs/MR around the Commonwealth, it has 
moved residents into community placements.  More than 
three-fourths of all remaining ICF/MR residents are 
diagnosed as having profound “mental retardation,” and many 
residents have other disabilities as well.  For example, Ms. 
Solano has a mental age at or below one year, is non-verbal, 
is incapable of caring for herself or understanding more than 
the simplest commands, and thereby needs constant around-
the-clock care.  Likewise, her condition stems from Down‟s 
Syndrome, and, like other older individuals with Down‟s 
Syndrome, she has early stages of dementia together with a 
broad range of physical ailments.  According to Appellants, 
59% of all residents are non-verbal, nearly 50% are unable to 
walk, 56% have seizure disorders, 27% have cerebral palsy, 
26% have autism, 23% are visually impaired, and 16% 
require a feeding tube.  Many residents, in turn, have lived at 
these facilities for several decades.  Close relationships have 
often developed between residents and staff members.  For 
instance, at least one ICF/MR resident calls staff members 
“Mommy.” 
 
 The ICF/MR residents are not the only individuals 
who have aged—so have their closest family members.  
Because, among other things, parents have passed away, there 
are some residents who have no close relatives involved in 
their care.  Therefore, it appears that 82% of all residents have 
no appointed guardian.  On the other hand, approximately 
80% of the residents do apparently have either a guardian or, 
at least, an involved family member. 
 
 Turning to the Settlement Agreement negotiated by the 
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parties and approved by the District Court, we begin by 
observing that it subjects Appellants and all other ICF/MR 
residents, guardians, and involved family members to an 
annual—and mandatory—assessment process.  DPW 
specifically agreed to create, maintain, and update a 
“Planning List” consisting of “all state ICF/MR residents who 
have been identified as not opposed to discharge to 
community placement.”  (JA470.)  Specifically, DPW “will 
assess opposition to discharge by state ICF/MR residents and 
their involved families or guardians no later than September 
30, 2011, and at least annually thereafter.”  (Id.)  “[T]he state 
ICF/MR resident‟s social worker or Community Transition 
Specialist, or both, together with the Facility Advocate, will 
determine whether the state ICF/MR resident should be 
placed on the State ICF/MR Planning List based on 
discussions with the resident and involved family or 
guardians to assess their position as to community 
placement.”  (Id.)  Evidently, each and every ICF/MR 
resident, guardian, and involved family member has been 
required to undergo these reviews, and there is no mechanism 
for opting out of this ongoing procedure.  We also note that 
the initial assessments were completed by September 2011, 
resulting in 238 residents ending up on the Planning List. 
 
  It is uncontested that the Facility Advocates are 
employees of DRN, the organization that has represented 
Plaintiffs throughout the course of this litigation.  In cases of 
disagreement, the Facility Director makes the final decision, 
but he or she must do so based, inter alia, on interviews with 
the Facility Advocate.  Furthermore, Appellees acknowledge 
that the Facility Advocates, as “generally passive observers,” 
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do “occasionally provide input to answer questions or to 
correct gross misunderstandings (such as that the Agreement 
requires institutional closures).”  (Appellees‟ Brief at 62.)  In 
turn, one of the objectors (Kenneth Myers, who joined in the 
brief supporting Appellants that was filed by VOR, Inc.) 
stated under oath at the fairness hearing that “the facility 
advocate at White Haven Center was very insistent on 
inserting her views into the interview process and questioned 
me repeatedly about the wisdom of my choices as guardian 
for my sister.”  (JA1449.)  Sassaman, a Selinsgrove Facility 
Advocate, likewise testified that she drew a comparison 
between moving to a community placement and a vacation—
at least for purposes of making it clear that the residents 
would not be moving to another site (also apparently called a 
“community”) at the ICF/MR facility.   Appellees‟ “State 
Center (ICF/MR) Community Planning List Assessment” 
form also includes questions such as:  “Do you want to live 
closer to your family?”  (JA1499.) 
 
    Appellants take issue with the Settlement 
Agreement‟s allegedly one-sided educational, training, and 
outreach programs.  The Settlement Agreement sets up a 
Steering Committee for the express purpose of developing 
and implementing “a program to educate state ICF/MR 
residents and their involved families about community 
placement.”  (JA472.)  This Steering Committee must 
include, among its various members, representatives from 
DRN, a community care provider, the entities that contract 
with DPW to administer the community care system, together 
with an individual with intellectual disabilities living in the 
community as well as a family member of a person with 
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intellectual disabilities living in the community.  The 
Settlement Agreement, in turn, says nothing about any 
possible disadvantages or risks of community placement or 
about the possible advantages of ICF/MR care.  On the 
contrary, the Steering Committee is required to develop a 
training curriculum that addresses, among other things, the 
availability of “specialized programs” for elderly, medically 
fragile, or difficult individuals, funding for community 
services, and “opportunities to participate in community life.”  
(JA473.)  According to the Settlement Agreement, DPW must 
conduct a minimum of three training sessions at each of the 
five ICFs/MR every year.  DPW is also required to provide 
ICF/MR residents and their guardians and involved family 
members with opportunities to visit community placements, 
meet with providers, and, as part of a one-to-one outreach 
program, discuss community placements with family 
members of individuals with intellectual disabilities who 
currently live in community settings.   “State ICF/MR 
residents and their involved families and guardians will be 
given an opportunity after they participate in training events 
or have outreach contacts to state their position on discharge,” 
and DPW then “will supplement or amend” the Planning List.  
(JA474.)  DPW likewise must provide periodic status reports 
on its implementation of the Settlement Agreement, but the 
Settlement Agreement does not expressly require any updates 
on such issues as whether relocated residents are being 
provided with appropriate care in their community 
placements or whether any mistakes have been made in the 
assessment and relocation processes. 
 
 In fact, the annual and mandatory assessment 
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procedure appears to involve a kind of default rule for a 
number of ICF/MR residents.  The Settlement Agreement 
expressly provides that, “[i]f the state ICF/MR resident does 
not express opposition to considering community placement, 
the resident will be placed on the State ICF/MR Planning 
List” with the following exceptions:  (1) if the resident does 
not express a preference for community placement but has 
involved family or a guardian who is opposed to community 
placement; or (2) if the resident expresses a preference for 
community placement but has a guardian who is opposed to 
community placement.  (JA471.)  The “State Center 
(ICF/MR) Community Planning List Assessment Protocol” 
states that, “[i]f the person does not provide input in any 
manner that can be discerned in response to the questions in 
this section, [it is to be] indicate[d] that they have no 
preference regarding living in the community.”  (JA1497.)  
“[R]esidents will be placed on the State ICF/MR Planning 
List” if, inter alia, “Person has no preference and has no 
involved family/guardian” or “Person has no preference and 
there is no involved family/guardian opposition.”  (JA1498.)  
In the end, it appears that a resident whose disabilities are so 
severe that he or she is incapable of expressing, in some 
fashion, where he or she wishes to live—and who otherwise 
lacks a guardian or involved family member or his or her 
guardian or involved family member fails to express 
opposition to community placement—must be placed on the 
Planning List. 
 
 Appellants themselves (whose guardians and involved 
family members have so adamantly opposed community 
placement) do not fall within this default category at this 
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present time.  However, Appellants evidently face an ongoing 
and mandatory mechanism in which a non-responsive 
resident is placed on the Planning List unless the guardian or 
involved family member continues to make his or her 
opposition known each and every year until the Settlement 
Agreement expires.  If an Appellant‟s aging guardian or 
involved family member dies or otherwise becomes unable to 
express his or her opposition on behalf of the ICF/MR 
resident, it appears that his or her past opposition would no 
longer preclude application of this apparent default rule and 
the resident‟s inclusion on the Planning List.  The guardian or 
involved family member must continue to communicate his 
or her continuing opposition to the DPW and otherwise find 
and designate an adequate substitute or successor.  Indeed, it 
appears that a “no preference” response for the guardian or 
involved family member is entered if DPW is unable to reach 
him or her after three telephone calls and the delivery of a 
certified letter. 
 
 Turning to the community placement system itself, we 
acknowledge that Plaintiffs and DPW agreed that all ICF/MR 
residents, with the appropriate supports and services, could 
live in the community setting and that the District Court itself 
accepted this admission.  However, we further note that 
Appellants and Appellees (together with the respective 
Amici) vigorously contest the capacities and characteristics—
as well as the respective benefits and risks—of the 
community placement and ICF/MR systems.  In any case, 
inclusion on the Planning List and subsequent relocation from 
an ICF/MR to a community placement obviously has serious 
consequences—whether good or bad—for the relocated 
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resident as well as any guardian or involved family member 
he or she may have.  Among other things, an ICF/MR 
resident moved to a community placement then generally has 
a 60-day trial period in which to return to his or her prior 
placement.  After that period expires, it appears that a court 
order generally must be obtained for the resident to return to 
the ICF/MR. 
 
 Finally, “Appellants believe the settlement will have 
an adverse effect on the State Centers” (Appellants‟ Reply 
Brief at 5), claiming that “the settlement will depopulate them 
and may cause a reduction in their funding[, a reduction in the 
quality of care provided at the ICFs/MR,] and, ultimately, one 
or more of their closures” (Appellants‟ Brief at 64).  While it 
was “not possible to determine . . . whether . . . reallocation 
will result in the closing of one or more ICFs/MR” at the time 
of our prior opinion, the remedy stage of this case renders 
Appellants‟ interests here far less speculative.  Benjamin, 432 
F. App‟x at 98-99.  The Settlement Agreement itself 
addresses the critical question of funding at some length.  
Among other things, it evidently requires DPW to:  (1) 
request, as one of its top budget priorities in its budget 
proposal to the Governor, “appropriations to fund the 
development of community placements to meet the 
Integration Plan‟s benchmarks;” (2) “consider the feasibility 
and propriety of consolidating the budget lines for state 
ICFs/MR and Community Waiver services;” (3) to the extent 
feasible, “shift funds from the carry-forward budget for state 
ICFs/MR to the Community Waiver services budget;” and (4) 
modify its policies and practices to assure that persons on the 
Planning List have access to existing community placement 
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vacancies.  (JA475-JA476.)  In the end, this remedy stage of 
the litigation involves more than just a mere “competitor” for 
“limited public resources” challenging a judgment that “will 
occasion some reallocation of [such] resources.”  Benjamin, 
432 F. App‟x at 99. 
 
 Based on this review of the settlement reached by 
Appellees, we determine that Appellants satisfy the second 
and third requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 
22(a)(2) with respect to the remedy stage of this complex and 
important proceeding.  We again note that the District Court, 
in its order denying Appellants‟ remedy-stage motions to 
intervene, did not expressly acknowledge the complexities 
posed by this distinct stage or address the apparent effects of 
the Settlement Agreement on Appellants or others.  However, 
the District Court‟s subsequent opinion granting final 
approval to the Settlement Agreement actually provides 
further support for our determination. 
 
 While the District Court indicated that the reactions of 
the class itself were almost entirely favorable and that the 
relatively small number of objections were based on 
misguided fears of forced removals and ICF/MR closures, it 
also stated that the objections themselves “were not only 
numerous, but some were also cogently expressed and many 
were at times quite eloquent and even poignant.”  Benjamin, 
807 F. Supp. 2d at 213.  The District Court recognized that 
“all state ICF/MR residents are affected in some way by the 
Proposed Settlement Agreement because all residents will be 
subject to evaluation,” only to qualify this statement by 
adding that “any effect on those who wish not to be 
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discharged is negligible compared to the effect that a 
wholesale denial of the Settlement Agreement will have on 
those who do not oppose discharge.”  Id. at 207 n.2.  
Likewise, it noted that, “[a]lthough the rights of those who 
are non-class members must be vigilantly protected, their 
objections do not destroy the cohesiveness of the class 
members.”  Id. at 208 n.4. 
 
 Most significantly, the District Court advised “the 
parties to implement the settlement with caution.”  Id. at 209.  
According to the District Court: 
 
To our admittedly untrained eye, it appears as 
though the assessment protocol that has been 
developed to effectuate the Proposed Settlement 
Agreement may imply an unintended bias 
towards community placement.  Reviewing the 
questionnaire to be utilized causes us to 
entertain serious doubts as to whether it is the 
proper tool for gauging whether the profoundly 
disabled, and especially those with no guardian 
to speak for them, are opposed to community 
placement.  Indeed, we wonder about the 
wisdom of defaulting such individuals into a no 
preference category without greater analysis.  
And we have no doubt that the stated fears of 
many objectors, including those contained in 
the eloquent presentation by Mr. Solano on 
behalf of his sister, are heartfelt and entirely 
real.  We urge those responsible for 
implementing the policy to consider these 
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concerns, and if necessary revise the protocols 
in question. . . .  
 
Id. at 209-10.  But the District Court then indicated that 
objectors concerned about any supposed policy to shut down 
ICFs/MR must look to their elected representatives and DPW 
policymakers.  The District Court noted that while no remedy 
in a context in which “family members must make wrenching 
decisions regarding loved ones who are in many cases 
profoundly impaired” will ever be perfect, the settlement 
presented here “is worthy of our approval” as a reasonable 
resolution and remedy for illegal conduct.  Id. at 210.  In its 
subsequent order denying a partial stay pending appeal, the 
District Court dismissed its own language as nothing more 
than insubstantial dicta. 
 
 In the end, the District Court‟s various observations 
resemble in many ways our own analysis of the Settlement 
Agreement and its possible effects on the protectable interests 
of Appellants and other ICF/MR residents, guardians, and 
involved family members.  In short, the District Court was 
troubled by the poignant objections received in this matter, 
the apparent effects of the Settlement Agreement even on 
non-members of the class, and, in particular, the “default” 
treatment of residents who are unable to express a preference 
and otherwise lack a guardian or involved family member. 
 
 We noted in our prior opinion that Plaintiffs 
“recognize that „Olmstead requires that patients eligible and 
desirious of community placement be discharged into 
community-based programs [only] if placement can be 
 41 
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources 
of the state and the needs of other persons in its care.‟”  
Benjamin, 432 F. App‟x at 96 (quoting Frederick L., 422 F.3d 
at 156-57).  In Olmstead, Justice Ginsburg (expressly joined 
by Justices O‟Connor, Souter, and Breyer) reached the 
following conclusion: 
 
 For the reasons stated, we conclude that, 
under Title II of the ADA, States are required to 
provide community-based treatment for persons 
with mental disabilities when the State‟s 
treatment professionals determine that such 
placement is appropriate, the affected persons 
do not oppose such treatment, and the 
placement can be reasonably accommodated, 
taking into account the resources available to 
the State and the needs of others with mental 
disabilities. . . . 
 
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J.) (plurality opinion); 
see also, e.g., id. at 587 (Ginsburg, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 
 At this juncture, we simply conclude that the Supreme 
Court‟s decision in Olmstead provides some additional 
support for our already limited determination with respect to 
the second and third requirements for intervention as of right 
under Rule 24(a)(2).  In short, we have already explained at 
some length the various ways the Settlement Agreement may 
affect or impair the protectable interests of Appellants and 
other ICF/MR residents, guardians, and involved family 
members.  Under the circumstances, Appellants should have 
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the opportunity to be heard insofar as the Settlement 
Agreement may have an impact on the available resources as 
well as the needs of other individuals with mental disabilities, 
especially other ICF/MR residents.  See, e.g., Ligas, 2010 WL 
1418583, at *2-*6.
3
 
                                                 
3
 The District Court stated in its initial intervention decision 
that it was persuaded by the holdings of the Seventh Circuit 
and the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois in the Ligas litigation, noting that “both parties 
have recognized and relied on this case due to its almost 
identical circumstances to the instant case.”  Benjamin, 267 
F.R.D. at 462.  However, we believe that subsequent events in 
this Illinois proceeding actually weigh in Appellants‟ favor.  
    
 After the Illinois district court refused to approve a 
proposed consent decree and decertified the class, plaintiffs, 
“[w]ith a new class definition in hand,” requested class 
certification as well as preliminary approval of another 
proposed consent decree.  Ligas, 2010 WL 1418583, at *1.  
Their motion, however, was dismissed as moot because the 
district court instead granted a motion to intervene filed by 
“approximately 2,000 previous objectors who lived in 
intermediate care facilities for people with developmental 
disabilities („ICF-DD‟) or are on a waiting list for an ICF-DD 
as well as at least one individual who currently resides in a 
community integrated living arrangement („CILA‟).”  Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Relying on Olmstead, the Illinois district 
court determined that these objectors were entitled to 
intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) as to the new proposed consent 
decree.  Id. at *2-*4.  It also allowed them to intervene with 
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 Before moving to the final requirement for 
intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), we again wish to 
emphasize the limited scope of our decision.  We merely 
determine that, given the possible effects of the Settlement 
Agreement, Appellants possess “a sufficient interest” in the 
remedy stage of the litigation and that their “interest may be 
affected or impaired as a practical matter” by the disposition 
of this distinct stage of this complex yet important case.  We 
express no opinion whatsoever as to whether or not the 
Settlement Agreement (or any other settlement that may be 
reached in this proceeding) should ultimately be approved—
or whether the class itself should or should not be decertified.  
All such matters must be decided in the first instance by the 
District Court on remand—with the full and appropriate 
participation of Appellants as Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors. 
 
 4. Representation of the Interest by an Existing 
Party 
 
 Although not really emphasized in the appellate 
briefing, we note that Appellants must establish inadequacy 
of representation in order to intervene as of right under Rule 
24(a)(2).  See, e.g., Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at 368.  In 
general, “the burden of making that showing should be 
treated as minimal.‟”  Id. (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine 
Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)).  Again, the District 
Court denied the motions to intervene filed in connection with 
the remedy stage of this case without any real discussion of 
this (or any other) requirement, and it merely incorporated by 
                                                                                                             
respect to the new class definition.  Id. at *5-*6. 
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reference its previous order denying the Springstead 
Intervenors‟ liability-stage motion to intervene.  Although we 
did not reach this issue in our prior opinion, the District Court 
did conclude that the Springstead Intervenors failed to 
demonstrate that DPW was an inadequate representative of 
their alleged interests.  However, in doing so, it expressly 
cited to the early stage of the litigation.  See Benjamin, 267 
F.R.D. at 464 (“Finally, although Applicants attempt to 
downplay the parallel positions of Defendants and 
Springstead Intervenors of opposing the relief sought at this 
early of the litigation, Applicants fail to demonstrate that 
Defendants will fail to prosecute their defenses in the future 
or will alter their position in this litigation.”).  Since then, 
circumstances have changed. 
 
 While their interests were possibly aligned prior to the 
District Court‟s summary judgment decision and its finding 
of liability, DPW‟s interests thereafter shifted from generally 
maintaining and defending the status quo to reaching a cost-
effective settlement responsive to the successful disability 
discrimination theory of liability advanced by Plaintiffs on 
behalf of themselves and the other class members.  Although 
DPW may still be charged by law with representing the 
interests of all persons under its care (and may constitute the 
substitute decision-maker for ICF/MR residents who are 
incapable of expressing any preference and have no guardians 
or involved family members), these persons now include both 
Plaintiffs and Appellants—two groups with quite divergent 
desires and interests.  There is a general presumption that a 
government entity is an adequate representative.  See, e.g., 
Kleissler, 157 F.3d at 972.  “But the presumption 
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notwithstanding, when an agency‟s views are necessarily 
colored by its view of the public welfare rather than the more 
parochial views of a proposed intervenor whose interest is 
personal to it, the burden is comparatively light.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  We further note that Appellees have not 
submitted any briefing expressly addressing this final 
intervention requirement or specifically explaining how the 
Settlement Agreement satisfies their obligations to protect 
Appellants as well as other non-class members.  We also 
believe that intervention here could very well assist DPW in 
fulfilling its Olmstead “obligation to administer services with 
an even hand.”  Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587 (Ginsburg, J.) 
(plurality opinion). 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate:  (1) the 
District Court‟s August 16, 2011 order insofar as it denied 
Appellants‟ motions to intervene as of right in the remedy 
stage of this litigation; and (2) the District Court‟s order of 
September 2, 2011 granting final approval to the Settlement 
Agreement.  In turn, we will remand this matter to the District 
Court with specific instructions to grant Appellants‟ motions 
to intervene as of right in the remedy stage of this litigation as 
well as to permit Appellants, as proper intervenors, to 
challenge the Settlement Agreement and to seek 
decertification of the class.  We, however, express no opinion 
as to whether or not the Settlement Agreement (or any other 
settlement that may be reached in this proceeding) should 
ultimately be approved or disapproved—or whether or not the 
class should be decertified. 
